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Abstract 
The central thesis of the paper is that Multinational Companies (MNC) should invest in the 
use of “soft” methods (socially responsible behavior) to mitigate costs in society accrued due 
to use of “hardcore” tax evasion tactics (Transfer mispricing) to maximize profits from 
operations in developing countries and/or countries with weak or inefficient tax laws and tax 
collection institutions. Therefore, we articulate the argument of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) as an indirect compensation for transfer mispricing. Our aim is not to 
present CSR as solution to transfer mispricing. An analytical approach is based on a content 
analysis of the existing literature with emphasis on a case study. We first discuss the dark side 
of transfer pricing (TP), next we present the link between TP and poverty and finally we 
advance arguments for CSR as a compensation for transfer mispricing. While acknowledging 
that TP is a legal accounting practice, we argue that in light of its poverty and 
underdevelopment externalities, the practice per se should be a strong defence for CSR 
because it is also associated with schemes that deprive developing countries of the capital 
essential for investment in health, education and development programmes.  
 
JEL Classification: F20; H20; M14; O11 
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1. Introduction  
The central thesis of the paper is that Multinational Companies (MNC) should invest 
in the use of “soft” methods (socially responsible behavior) to mitigate costs in society 
accrued due to use of “hardcore” tax evasion tactics (Transfer mispricing) to maximize profits 
from operations in developing countries and/or countries with weak or inefficient tax laws and 
tax collection institutions. Hence, the central thesis has scholarly and policy relevance in at 
least three key aspects, notably: a development aspect; a tax enforcement aspect and a social 
responsibility aspect. The paper defines and explains the central concepts that are used, in the 
light of existing literature, namely:  transfer pricing, transfer mispricing and Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). The research explains that the evasion of taxes in poor jurisdictions 
could affect the ability of authorities in the corresponding jurisdictions to provide public 
commodities (e.g. basic services such as schooling, health care and social care) and hence, 
engaging in CSR by contributing toward providing the attendant public commodities can 
enhance the reputation of the MNC as well as make the prospective workforce more able.   
Transfer pricing (TP) is a process by which commodities are traded between legal 
entities or subsidiaries within a corporation (Asongu, S. A., 2016). It consists of setting the 
price at which goods and services are sold by one subsidiary to another. For instance, if a 
subsidiary corporation sells commodities to another subsidiary, the cost of the commodities 
sold is transferred to the buying subsidiary through the transfer price. Some of these 
subsidiaries with legal entities that are within the control of a parent company include 
branches as well as corporations that are majority or wholly owned by the parent 
establishment. Within a broader framework of globalisation, TP can be employed as a method 
of allocating profits (or losses) before taxes to various nations where a multinational 
corporation does business. In a nutshell, TP is a process, relating to prices charged between 
affiliates within the same group of corporations (Asongu, S. A., 2016). While transfer pricing 
and transfer mispricing are used in this paper, in its ideal form transfer pricing involves 
companies 'correctly' pricing imports and exports between subsidiaries. Transfer mispricing is 
therefore the incorrect pricing of imports and exports between subsidiaries of the same 
company.   
 In order to avoid transfer mispricing, it is required that the transaction price between 
companies should be the same as a price in the open market. This is known as the ‘arm’s 
length principle’ of transfer pricing which states that the amount demanded for a commodity 
by one party must be supplied by the other party as though both parties were unrelated. While 
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such a principle is employed in the absence of good laws and legislation that prevent a nation 
from monitoring transfer mispricing,  very rarely is there consensus as to the ‘correct’ arm's 
length principle (except perhaps for some commodities).   
 In principle, TP should be consistent with either what the buyer would independently 
pay or what the seller would freely charge. Unfortunately, whereas unrealistic price transfers 
among subsidiaries does not affect the corporation or multinational in overall terms, TP 
becomes an issue for taxing authorities within a government when the accounting practice is 
used to (i) increase profits in countries with low tax jurisdictions (or low income taxes) and 
(ii) decrease profits in countries with high tax jurisdictions (or high income taxes). Given that 
tax havens are in the former category, TP is a principal mechanism for tax avoidance and the 
shifting of profits.  
There is a consensus in the literature that corporations need to cater for some of the 
needs of communities in which they operate (Asongu, J.J; 2007). According to the narrative, 
the act by corporations of going beyond the delivery of commodities to tackling some of the 
core demands of society has been acknowledged as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
CSR within the context of this study refers to a company’s initiative in examining and taking 
responsibility for its impacts on social and environmental wellbeing. According to Asongu, 
J.J1, there are four main traditional arguments for CSR, namely, the: (i) brand image (or 
reputation), (ii) ethical (or moral), (iii) legal (or licence-to-operate) and (iv) sustainability 
arguments. The conceptions of CSR that fit the problem statement raised in the inquiry are the 
first-two. This is essentially because engaging in CSR increases the reputation of a MNC 
while at the same serving as an indirect compensation of transfer mispricing practices.  
 Over the past decades, the presence of Multinational Companies (MNCs) in 
developing countries has increased the debate as to what extent MNCs should invest in social 
amenities in the communities in which they operate (Sinder et al., 2003; Matten & Moon, 
2004; Valentine & Fleischman, 2008; Uduji & Okolo-Obasi, 2019a, 2019b). This deliberation 
has been inflamed by evidence on the role of globalisation in developing economies and 
consequent implications for human development (Asongu, S.A; 2013a; Asongu, S.A, 2015; 
Stiglitz, 2007; Chang, 2008; Mshomba, 2011; Uduji et al., 2019a).  
It is reasonable to infer that the arguments against globalisation are evolving partly 
because Multinational Companies (MNCs) are failing in their role as good corporate citizens. 
                                                          
1
 There are two authors with last names as Asongu used in this study, namely: Asongu, J.J and Asongu, S.A. 
Hence, the interested reader should not construe the recurrence of Asongu as citations for only one person.  
5 
 
This is essentially because, whereas the spirit of capitalism is motivating MNCs in their ever 
increasing quests to boost  profits, civil societies of countries in which they operate are 
becoming less tolerant of MNCs that are failing to address their social responsibilities (Branco 
& Rodrigues, 2006; Osabuohien et al., 2013, 2014, 2015). One recurrent mechanism via 
which MNCs are evading their responsibilities towards countries in which they operate is tax 
evasion through transfer mispricing (Sikka, 2010; Hoi et al., 2013; Jenkins & Newell, 2013). 
While acknowledging that TP is a necessary and indispensible practice in the era of 
globalisation, this article argues that TP per se should also be a solid justification for more 
CSR because the practice by definition enables underlying MNCs to surreptitiously evade 
their tax obligations. Intuitively, transfer mispricing practices are concealed by MNCs within 
the framework of TP which is considered as legal. Therefore since MNCs would not admit to 
engaging in transfer mispricing, CSR can also be considered as some form of social justice.  
 Whereas, traditional advocates of CSR have employed concepts such as reputation, 
licence-to-operate, sustainability and moral obligation to make the case for CSR, recently 
there has been growing emphasis on other forms of arguments for CSR, inter alia: innovation 
(Asongu, J.J. 2007). The present inquiry extends this stream of literature by arguing that 
because TP is inherently connected with transfer mispricing, the practice of TP should 
naturally be a genuine justification for CSR. In this light, we take care in distinguishing this 
form of CSR from good works or charitable donations. 
 We devote space to clarifying transfer mispricing as an argument for CSR. Consistent 
with Vogel (2005), Fleming and Jones (2012) and Davis et al. (2016), arguments for CSR can 
be made on three broad grounds. They are: (i) CSR is beneficial to the corporation (e.g. in 
improving the corporation’s finances and reputation), (ii) corporations have a moral 
obligation to operate in ways that are broadly beneficial to society, not simply to maximise 
returns for their stockholders and (iii) a combination of (i) and (ii). These grounds are broadly 
consistent with Maignan and Ralston (2002) and Neergaard and Pedersen (2003) on the 
influence of stakeholders to CSR as well as internal and external drivers of CSR.  
Regardless of the grounds upon which the corporation stands, CSR as an argument for 
transfer mispricing is not aimed at eliminating transfer mispricing. On the contrary, this study 
is an argument that CSR should be an indirect compensation for the concealed practices of 
transfer mispricing.  The perspective is most eloquently presented by Davis et al. (2016) who 
have argued that for many corporations, CSR plays the role of a substitute for paying tax. 
According to the argument, in the contemporary socio-political atmosphere, companies 
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strongly associated with CSR are simultaneously also characterised with paying low levels of 
tax. This perspective consolidates the intuition motivating this inquiry in that the separation 
between CSR and tax in many companies is deliberately done for political and strategic 
reasons. For instance, MNCs use CSR as some form of cosmetic window-dressing to 
compensate for the concern about their profits relative to tax paid. The perspective of Davis et 
al. (2016) is broadly consistent with the literature pertaining to the limits of CSR; notably: (i) 
contrary to developed countries where CSR has led to improved standards in labour, 
environmental practices and human rights, there is an apparent reduction of CSR in improving 
corporate conduct in developing countries in the absence of effective and extensive 
government regulation (Vogel, 2005); (ii) CSR is designed to conceal the insidious activities 
of corporations because it helps to deflect criticism of them by endowing such corporations 
with the rationale for pursuing activities for which shareholders’ value is increased (Banerjee, 
2009); (iii) CSR-related activities are a means of  consolidating legitimacy from employees 
and consumers and, hence, boost the colonizing and exploitative agenda of most corporations 
(Fleming & Jones, 2012). It is important to note that the narrative of Davis et al. (2016), 
within the context of this study, is meant to articulate the argument of CSR as an indirect 
compensation for transfer mispricing.  
In the light of the above, the argument in this study neither builds on the eradicating of 
TP nor on the eliminating of transfer mispricing. The former cannot be abolished because it is 
a legal accounting practice and the latter cannot be eliminated because poor countries do not 
have proper legislation and laws in place for the purpose. The indirect connection between 
transfer mispricing and CSR is that most poor countries lack proper legislation and laws to 
monitor and sanction transfer mispricing. Hence, in the absence of effective laws and 
legislation that oversee TP practices by MNCs, it is very likely that MNCs will not consider 
transfer mispricing as illegal because the laws in place are not effective at identifying it.  
Moreover, the absence of proper legislation and laws may prevent the country from 
monitoring the arm’s length principle of transfer pricing which states that the amount 
demanded for a commodity by one party must be supplied by the other party as though both 
parties were unrelated. In other words, the transaction price should be the same as a price in 
the open market. Whereas implementing this principle may sound easy from the perspective 
of comparing prices from transactions that are not related, the evaluation becomes more 
complicated when it concerns intangibles or propriety commodities. Hence, in the light of 
issues associated with the arm’s length principle, better regulation is needed because CSR 
7 
 
cannot serve as a substitute for transfer mispricing, inter alia (i) a unitary taxation for 
transnational corporations (Picciotto, 2012) and (ii) under specific scenarios,  within the 
economic sphere, price planning by private corporations should be examined as a component 
of political rule because even with the arm’s length principle, a substantial amount of trade at 
the international level cannot be assessed by genuine transactions in the market (Ylönen &  
Teivainen, 2015). Furthermore as a means to improving regulation, MNCs may be required to 
voluntarily adopt the Fair Tax Mark initiative which is a mark that companies achieve if they 
adopt nondiscriminatory and transparent tax practices.  
This Fair Tax Mark is an initiative which advocates that when taxes are paid honestly, 
they help fund essential public commodities. Fair payment according to the initiative also 
ensures a level playing field for businesses of all size. Companies are therefore encouraged to 
report their tax practices transparently for their contributions to society to be established. 
Therefore, the Fair Tax Mark celebrates companies that are transparent in the tax practices by 
granting them some just recognition. Within the framework of this study, MNCs that are 
recognised and listed with Fair Tax Mark may use such ratings to justify their lower 
engagement in CSR2.  
In the light of the above, in an increasing globalised world, developing nations are 
growingly opening-up their borders to investments and trade, which exposes them to issues 
pertaining to tax base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). Given the growing requirement in 
developing countries that fully effective TP regimes should be put in place in order to address 
the risks associated with BEPS (which reduces the much needed tax income for economic 
development, in 2011), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Task Force on Tax and Development  started a programme designed to provide 
support to developing countries which are seeking to strengthen and/or implement rules of TP 
(Abbas & Alexander, 2013; OECD, 2017). The impact of the programme is increasingly 
significant in all countries where the TP rules are being implemented in alignment with 
international standards. According to the narrative, the programme has had a significant effect 
in all countries of operation embodying: (i) the introduction of rules of transfer pricing that 
are aligned with international standards; (ii) setting-up of units of specialization to perform 
works related to transfer pricing and (iii) enhanced revenues from audits pertaining to transfer 
pricing. Meanwhile in order for the developing countries to fully benefit from the programme, 
                                                          
2
 More information on the Fair Tax Mark can be found  on the following link: https://fairtaxmark.net/who-we-
are/ 
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there is need to further scale-up the OECD’s new Inclusive Framework in the coming years 
(Crivelli et al., 2016; OECD, 2017). Such scaling-up entails training, guidance and the 
development of tools relevant in assisting countries in the pragmatic application of adopted 
rules governing transfer pricing.  
 The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses linkages between 
transfer mispricing, extreme poverty and CSR.  Here, we first discuss transfer mispricing as 
the dark side of TP, then argue about the linkages between TP and poverty before finally 
presenting the case for CSR in transfer mispricing. Section 3 presents practical insights with a 
case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s mining industry and Glencore Plc. We 
conclude with Section 4.  
 
2. Transfer Mispricing, Extreme Poverty and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
2.1 The negative side of transfer pricing (TP) 
The negative side of TP is obviously ‘transfer mispricing’ which has been documented 
to be linked to tax avoidance and retention of wealth (Sikka & Willmott, 2010; Asongu, S.A, 
2016).  According to this stream in the literature, TP is a legitimate accounting practice which 
has gained more prominence with the advent of globalisation because the operations of 
corporations extend beyond national borders with different taxation regimes and regulations. 
In essence, the ever growing quest to increase company cash flows, profits and goals of 
marketing, among others, have also prompted underlying companies with a multinational  
position to adopt measures of cost performance and accounting for taxable profits that are of 
questionable business ethics, even by conservative standards. Within this framework, MNCs 
tailor cost- and overhead-allocation schemes that enable them to transfer commodities to 
various subsidiaries/branches. It is important to note that some discretion is enjoyed by 
companies which engage in TP owing to the subjective features in mechanisms of cost and 
overhead allocation. Hence, companies can assign commodities to specific geographic regions 
so as to increase profits and keep their taxes low. The basic idea in the TP strategy consists of 
allocating higher profits to low-tax jurisdictions and higher costs to  high-tax jurisdictions.  
Whereas TP can enable corporations to limit the downsides of double taxation, abuse 
of the practice is increasing and it is being employed by virtually all MNCs to shift profits 
(Baker, 2005). The above TP practices obviously have negative externalities on tax incomes, 
public service delivery and living standards in countries with relatively higher rates of 
corporate taxation, especially low income economies.  
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According to Asongu, S.A (2016), the strength of MNCs is being increasingly 
solidified with the spirit of capitalism such that microstates are increasingly taking precedence 
over nation states which are competing for investment needed for employment and taxable 
income. The outcome of the unfortunate scenario is that investments are delivered to nation 
states while subsequent profits are channelled to micro states. Consistent with the narrative, 
transfer mispricing schemes are also providing an enabling environment for the proliferation 
of microstates which are commonly known as offshore financial centres or ‘tax havens’.  
In light of the above, low-end taxation or microstates have been growing substantially 
(Sikka, 2010). Microstates have very small populations and hence less public expenditure is 
needed for public commodities and services. Some microstates are even tax-free and therefore 
do not have much regard for mispriced profits that are declared within their jurisdictions. It is 
important to put this point into perspective by articulating the growing depth of activities by 
MNCs in microstates. First, according to Sikka and Willmott (2010), microstates are 
witnessing the birth of over 200,000 new enterprises on a yearly basis. Baker (2005) claims 
that there were approximately 3,000,000 corporations registered in microstates by the year 
2000. Notable examples include: (i) the Cayman and British Virgin Islands accounting for 
respectively 3,389 and 182 companies for every 100 inhabitants, (ii) a single building in the 
Cayman Island accounting for approximately 19,000 companies and (iii) about 15,000 
corporations registered in  Sark Island that is host to only 574 residents (UK Home Office, 
1998). It is important to note that in the narrative, microstates are tax havens. This should not 
be misconstrued as an assimilation of all microstates to tax havens.  
It is important to note that the above microstates are also associated with developed 
countries. These more advanced nations have the legislative authority to provide a business 
environment that is favourable to MNCs, which are in constant search of obscure 
administrative structures: imposition of low/no taxes, preservation of secrecy and less 
stringent regulations. The above conditions are conducive to global tax avoidance schemes 
and transfer mispricing mechanisms. It is therefore unsurprising that whereas only about 50 
percent of transactions from global trade are traceable to offshore financial centers, these 
underlying tax havens constitute only about 3 percent of global GDP. Moreover, according 
Sikka and Willlmott (2010), whereas microstates make-up only about 1.2 percent of the 
world’s population, they represents about 26 percent of assets and 31 percent of net profits of 
the United States MNCs.  
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Given the above stylized facts, it is apparent that globalization is engendering novel 
trends in international taxation by MNCs (Asongu, S.A. 2016). According to Sikka and 
Willmott (2010), under the pressure of territorial juridical constraints, MNCs have been 
engineering mechanisms of tax avoidance by means of special purpose entities (SPEs), 
negotiating trust and joint ventures and establishing subsidiaries as well as affiliates that 
enable them to manipulate asymmetries in taxation systems around the world. It follows that 
worldwide production is increasingly creating innovative and entrenched networks of TP 
mechanisms which are being masterfully developed by MNCs to shift taxes to microstates, 
and so avoid them in countries where their mainstream operations are conducted. What is also 
striking is that the inherent complexity, scale and strength of globalization is facilitating both 
the good and bad sides of TP. Accordingly, production and distribution networks are 
progressively complex, notably (i) national companies are in a permanent quest for 
transnational and multinational profiles and (ii) foreign companies are at liberty to either 
jointly work with local corporations or establish new companies under different jurisdictions.  
The above scenarios illustrate the case of global trade that has increased international 
corporate legitimacy and by so doing has enhanced the ability of MNCs to introduce ‘tax 
avoidance’ TP schemes. There is a wealth of literature with evidence of MNCs manipulating 
international taxation privileges. Tanzi (2000) documented how tax administrators were 
deeply engaged in transfer mispricing. According to Sikka and Willmott (2010) and Asongu, 
S.A (2016), multilateral institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) are increasingly concerned with the 
plethora of issues in national taxation that have emerged in relation to transfer mispricing by 
MNCs, namely issues surrounding fixed costs, trademark valuations, loans and patents.  
Whereas the poverty externalities of such schemes may not be so apparent in 
developed nations, poor countries (especially resource-rich nations) are more likely to suffer, 
given that public goods and services are still substantially absent (Borkowski, 1997). 
Furthermore, developing countries are more vulnerable than their developed counterparts to 
some TP practices like illicit capital flight (Asongu, S.A. 2016).   
 
2.2 Linking transfer pricing (TP) to underdevelopment  
 
 We have already emphasised that while TP is a legitimate accounting practice because 
it is needed to distribute profits to various jurisdictions, transfer mispricing which is also a 
commonly associated practice leads to underdevelopment in countries with high corporate tax 
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jurisdictions, essentially because of shortage of taxable income that is needed for the delivery 
of public goods and services (Asongu, S.A., 2015, 2016).  
 The unfortunate link between transfer mispricing, losses in tax revenues and 
underdevelopment in high-tax nations has consistently been deplored by renowned policy 
makers and economists who have reached a consensus in acknowledging that, in its current  
form, the international taxation system is inequitable and socially damaging (see Walsh, 
2015). For example Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz has qualified as ‘unfair, inequitable and 
inefficient’ the manner in which MNCs operate nationally when their capital is global. Hence, 
according to him, these MNCs have “free rein to move their money around to the low-cost 
(tax) jurisdictions” (Walsh, 2015). Stiglitz further posits that this scenario has substantially 
deprived developing countries of capital essential for investments in health, education and 
development programmes. He further claims that “it undermines the social and economic 
fibre of a country”.  
 In order to substantiate the above narratives, we present some statistics and stylized 
facts in the paragraphs that follow. Given that capital flight is one of the main consequences 
of TP (Donnelly, 2015), recent estimates show that the stock of capital in some poor regions 
(e.g. Africa) would have been 60 percent higher had TP and illicit funds been kept on the 
continent. Moreover, the corresponding Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increase would have 
been some 15 percent higher had illicit capital flight been mitigated. On the basis that 
absolute pro-poor3 growth is a consequence of GDP growth, the connection between TP and 
poverty becomes apparent. According to Donnelly (2015), commercial corporations 
contribute to about 65 percent of illicit capital flows. Furthermore, it was suggested that 
deliberate over- and under-invoicing of trade activities represented approximately 67.4 
percent of illegal capital outflows between 2003 and 2012. Donnelly goes on to emphasize 
that about 60 billion USD are lost annually to TP-related activities like illicit capital flight.   
According to the Donnelly, illicit capital flows from Africa represent about 4 percent  
of  GDP; substantially outpacing official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). It is important to note that this illegal flow of money is the product of tax 
evasion made possible by mechanisms for, among others: bribery, trade misinvoicing, money 
laundering and transfer mispricing by MNCs. The report by Donnelly (2015) documented that 
in 2012 the stock of illicit capital flows from sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) stood in the 
                                                          
3
 Whereas ‘relative pro-poor growth’ is growth that reduces inequality, ‘absolute pro-poor growth’ is one that 
reduces poverty. The former engenders sub-optimal externalities for both rich and poor households (see, Asongu 
& Kodila-Tedika, 2015).  
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neighbourhood of 68.6 billion USD, compared to ODA and FDI that were respectively 41.1 
billion and 35.4 billion USD during the same interval. Asongu, S.A (2016) suggested that 
these estimates may be way lower because the real scale of illicit flows by their very nature is 
often under-reported.  
It is estimated by Fofack and Ndikumana (2010) that over the past decade, there was 
about 25 percent of capital flight loss due to TP-related activities. Had this dishonest capital 
flow being reinvested in Africa, GDP would otherwise have increased by between 19 percent 
and 35 percent. Diak (2014) argued that if tax income lost to transfer mispricing had been 
spent on health care, many children could have been saved every year. Mechanisms through 
which illicit capital flight and transfer mispricing contribute to underdevelopment have been 
substantially documented. Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a, 2012b) provided country-specific 
consequences of transfer mispricing whereas Nkurunziza (2012) empirically investigated 
relationships between illicit capital flows, transfer mispricing and poverty4.  
It is important to balance the above with the intuition that MNC directors are very 
likely to use every tax avoidance opportunity to argue that by decreasing tax on capital, they 
are working in the interest of shareholders. However, shareholders are likely to have 
heterogeneous interests with some valuing the social responsibility of MNCs as much as their 
share holdings.   
 
2.3 Arguments for CSR as a compensation for transfer mispricing  
 
 There has always been an intense debate about CSR. More specifically, while some 
scholars argue that the concept is not relevant to business, others view it as of strategic 
importance, passing through  and  some protagonists who admit its relevance but still stress 
that it is not good for business (Asongu, J.J. 2007). In light of the above, the relevance of CSR 
to business remains an open debate. According to Asongu, J.J, CSR embodies the notion that 
organisations have an obligation to acknowledge and take into account the interest of 
employees, customers, communities, the environment as well as shareholders in their 
operations. Moreover, the notion of CSR is tied to sustainable development which requires 
corporations to go beyond the ‘making of profit and payment of dividends’ so as to consider 
                                                          
4
 The interested reader can find more evidence  of  the linkages in  a substantial bulk of the literature devoted to 
the relationships (Boyce & Ndikumana, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2011, 2012ab; Weeks, 2012, 2015; Asongu, S.A., 
2013b, 2014; Efobi & Asongu, 2016; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017).  
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the long-run environmental and social consequences of their operations. Hence, such may be 
viewed as the continuous commitment to business ethics in order to contribute to socio-
economic development through improvements in the quality of life for the local community 
and society as a whole.  
 In the paragraphs that follow, we attempt to demonstrate that TP and CSR are not 
mutually exclusive. In fact their complementarity could inter alia: (i) consolidate 
shareholders’ trust, (ii) improve benefits by company employees, (iii) enhance company 
reputations, (iv) compensate for losses in investment as well as the absence of legislation in 
developing countries against transfer mispricing and (v) improve tax compliance by domestic 
companies. We discuss the above points chronologically in five main strands. The first-three 
components are broadly consistent with Groen (2014).  
 First, CSR from MNCs is very likely to increase shareholders’ trust. Accordingly, it is 
beneficial for shareholders if MNCs have a responsible CSR strategy. Another dimension 
from which CSR may be viewed is to conceive of it as being in the same category as 
dividends to shareholders in MNCs. In essence, the maximisation of shareholder value and 
CSR are not a contradiction because if MNCs do not engage in CSR, shareholders may be 
doubtful of the dividends apportioned them. Moreover, in the transition from Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), MNCs with a 
substantial degree of CSR are more likely to be positively viewed by many shareholders, civil 
society and multilateral development agencies (Uduji et al., 2019b, 2019c).  
 Second, investments in CSR are also very likely to be profitable for MNCs5. This is 
essentially because MNCs also use benefits from the social opportunities offered by the CSR 
schemes through, among others, improvements in human resources and efficiency in 
operations (Asongu, J.J. 2007). Other mutually beneficial social amenities include healthcare, 
infrastructural and educational development (Groen, 2014).  
 Third, with CSR the reputation of MNCs can also be substantially improved. In this 
light, CSR is also a kind of public relations appeal because the general public (including 
suppliers and customers) tend to view the involving MNC in a positive light. With the 
proliferation of information and communication technologies (ICTs), the concern with local 
                                                          
5
 It is important to note that this statement also highlights a problem in the perspective that tax issues and CSR 
are often held as distinct by companies in their existing practices and organizational arrangements. Moreover, 
because stopping tax avoidance would affect the economic bottom line of companies, for many corporations, 
CSR plays the role of a substitute for paying tax (see Davis et al., 2016).  
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and international corporate reputational damage is very important and hence a good track-
record in CSR may be a valuable asset in times of tax avoidance accusations and transfer 
mispricing. The position is even more relevant in societies where some MNCs’ stakeholders 
work and live in high-end tax countries. It is also relevant to clarify from this attendant 
paragraph that: (i) spending in CSR should not be construed as implying that engaging in 
CSR is more effective than paying taxes and (ii) the perception of company reputation is 
broad and hence, no distinction is made between local and international perceptions.  
 Fourth, we have already substantially discussed the need for MNCs to engage in CSR 
as a form of compensation for losses in tax income by nation states from which they operate. 
Our position on this line of inquiry is also substantiated by the fact that MNCs profit from the 
social opportunities offered by nation states which use taxed income from MNCs to provide 
public  goods and services. Accordingly, in the absence of tax income, welfare may plunge 
with obvious negative externalities for underlying MNCs, notably: mediocre education, poor 
health services and low public infrastructural quality owing to less maintenance. Hence, it is 
reasonable to argue that MNCs that are conscious of inherent transfer mispricing schemes 
should engage in more CSR as means of compensating for lost capital by nation states. 
Furthermore, there is an absence of, or lack of proper legislation against transfer mispricing in 
many developing countries. The documented challenges to formulating and implementing 
policies against the abuse of TP include: (i) lack of resources and knowledge, (ii) lack of 
comparable standards, (iii) income skewed by the Intellectual property (IP) regimes or the 
intangible economy to the benefit of advanced nations, (iv) lack of comprehensive tax treaties 
and (v) issues with location of savings (Asongu, S.A., 2016).  
Fifth, we further argue that CSR by multinational corporations could incite domestic 
companies to comply more willingly with their tax obligations and/or engage in similar 
activities. This position is consistent with Stiglitz who has postulated that endowing MNCs 
with breaks in taxes and implicitly giving them the leeway to indulge in transfer misprice, 
makes domestic corporations less willing to meet with their tax obligations: “If multinational 
companies are escaping taxation, domestic firms are put in an unfair competitive position and 
it distorts the economy” (Walsh, 2015).  
The foregoing arguments for CSR in respect of TP are also justified by two main 
complementary tendencies. They are (i) the growing strength of MNCs and (ii) increasing 
poverty levels in many developing countries in which underlying MNCs operate. This is 
because: 
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First, by the beginning of the 21st century, 51 of the top 100 largest economies were 
MNCs, not nation states (Anderson et al., 2005). We support the argument with five points. 
(1) According to Anderson et al., intellectual property rights (IPRs) have been monopolised to 
the height of 97 percent  by the OECD countries and 90 percent of the underlying proportion 
is retained by powerful MNCs. (2)  Developing nations which are overly reliant on agriculture 
have been left to the mercy of MNCs because: (i) twenty of them control trade in coffee; (ii) 
six  influence about 70 percent of wheat trade; (iii) two companies control approximately 80 
percent of the global grain market which is also distributed by two  MNCs and (iv)  one  
MNC has control over 98 percent of the production of packed tea. (3)  Two hundred 
corporations constitute approximately 28 percent of the global economy. (4) The top five 
hundred MNCs controlled 80 percent of FDI, 70 percent of global trade in commodities, 
about 33.3 percent of manufactured exports, 30 percent of global GDP and roughly 80 percent 
of trade in management and technical services. (5) The one-hundred largest corporations 
account for approximately $3400 billion worth of assets, of which 60 percent are located in 
foreign economies; that is developing countries many of which currently experiencing 
increasing levels of poverty.  
Second, the highlighted growing poverty in some developing countries has been 
recently confirmed by a World Bank report in April 2015 (Caulderwood, 2015; World Bank, 
2015). According to the report on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), poverty has been 
decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of SSA, where about 45 percent of 
countries are still substantially off-track from achieving the MDG extreme poverty target 
(Asongu, S.A  & Kodila-Tedika, 2017; Asongu & le Roux, 2017, 2019; Tchamyou, 2019a, 
2019b). This unfortunate trend substantially contrasts with the two decades of growth 
resurgence in the mid-1990s (see Alan & Carlyn, 2015; Fosu, 2015; Tchamyou et al., 2019). 
 
3. The Case of Glencore and the Mining Industry in the Democratic Republic of Congo  
 
Glencore Plc is an Anglo-Swiss MNC headquartered in Baar-Switzerland that 
specializes in commodity trading and mining (Why Poverty, 2013; Asongu, S.A 2016). 
According to the authors, by 2013 it was ranked among the top 10 Fortune Global 500 of the 
World’s largest companies. It is also the third largest family business in the world. 
Conversely, whereas the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been abundantly blessed 
with natural resources, it remains one of the poorest countries in the world (Daniele, 2011). 
The DRC is a nation state that is poor and at the same time rich.  
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We do not wish to deeply engage in the debate on transfer mispricing by Glencore in 
the DRC for the simple reason that it is difficult to establish such evidence. This is essentially 
because TP regimes in Africa present a very mixed picture. According to Curtis and Todorova 
(2011), some countries have: (i) well established TP regimes (South Africa and Kenya); (ii) 
recently passed TP legislation (Uganda); (iii) tax code provisions that only mention TP 
(Algeria and Mozambique); (iv) expectations of enacting TP legislation (Zimbabwe and 
Nigeria) and (v) no TP legislation/regulation (Sudan and Libya). This apparent heterogeneity 
among nations constitutes a substantial challenge to TP policy harmonization across Africa. 
Moreover, as far as we have reviewed, TP legislation is currently non-existent in the DRC. 
This implies that Glencore can misprice without oversight and sanctions from national 
authorities. This inference is also coupled with the fact that the secrecy surrounding 
Glencore’s deals with the DRC has been estimated to tarnish the long term reputation of the 
company, essentially because shareholders might have been involved in corrupt practices 
(Global Witness, 2012).  
We discuss Glencore’s CSR in three strands, namely: a highlight on the exercise of 
TP; Glencore’s CSR and caveats to her CSR. Narratives of underlying  elements are drawn 
from an independent assessment of Glencore’s CSR activities in the DRC by three notable 
organizations: (i) Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID); (ii) BREAD for All (a 
development foundation of the Swiss Protestant Churches) and (iii) Fastenopfer (the Catholic 
Lenten Fund is the Swiss Catholic relief agency) (Peyer et al., 2014).  
The first aspect which highlights evidence of TP is dealt with by Glencore’s taxation 
strategy. According to Peyer et al. (2014), there has been no substantial progress in the 
domain of taxation in the DRC. Thus, Glencore’s investment in community infrastructure and 
development projects should not conceal the fact this MNC is involved in optimising its tax 
liability through the transfer of profits to microstates or tax havens. For instance, taking 
exclusively the case of Kamoto Copper Company (KCC) which is Glencore’s DRC unit, TP 
practice costs the DRC some millions in USD between 2009 and 2014 (Peyer et al., 2014). 
This is very surprising given that the government of the DRC which is an indirect shareholder 
should not tolerate such transfer mispricing. Perhaps such inertia on the part of the DRC 
authorities may be traceable to the lack of legislation on transfer mispricing for the country’s 
mining industry and/or general corruption.  
In the second strand, consistent with Peyer et al. (2014), since the year 2012, and more 
precisely since Glencore merged with Xstrata, the MNC has improved its CSR policies, 
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notably by: (i) a more detailed sustainability report; (ii) a human rights which policy has been 
adopted; (iii) an application which has been made for admission into the ‘Voluntary Principles 
on Security and Human Rights’ and (iv) it  has integrated with the ‘International Council on 
Mining and Metals’ (ICMM). The following improvements are also noteworthy.  
First, on the ‘pollution of the Luilu River’, there has been some investment by the 
KCC in pipes and acid neutralisation systems in order to canalise ‘some of its effluent to an 
old quarry (Mupine)’ (p.115). However, contrary to the information provided by Glencore to 
the media and to its investors, the issue of pollution in the Luilu River remains to be resolved. 
This is despite the fact that the hydro-metallurgical plant is still discharging effluent (that is 
substantially contaminated with cobalt and copper) into the Luilu River.  
Second, in the ‘Basse-Kando Game Reserve’, Glencore has eventually acknowledged 
that installations at MUMI are located within the ‘Basse-Kando Game Reserve’. However, the 
MNC is still failing to engage in transparent and open negotiations with the relevant 
stakeholders, including the Ministry of Environment and the Congolese Institute for Nature 
Conservation (ICCN).  
 Third, with regard to ‘security and human rights’, Peyer et al. (2014) remarked that 
Glencore is continuously relying on police officers who often have recourse to excessive force 
and use of live ammunition to protect mines from thieves and clandestine miners. The report 
reveals that most of the human casualties suffered near KCC concessions have neither been 
adequately investigated nor have victims (or families of victims) received compensation. The 
MNC seems to have adopted a military approach in the protection of its assets. This 
represents opportunities for the violation of human rights, especially, when Glencore’s 
security forces are also entitled to execute judicial police functions at MUMI and KCC.  
 Fourth, concerning communities, whereas Glencore and its DRC subsidiaries have 
employed new staff to help enhance the company’s relations with local communities, the 
measures put in place are still not enough. Moreover, the approach which had not been 
previously sanctioned by human rights has not changed substantially. According to Peyer et 
al. (2014), Glencore still lacks accountability and transparency and genuine community 
participation is not promoted. According to the authors, Glencore is not taking the necessary 
measures to reduce the negative effects of its activities on local communities, inter alia: (i) 
the resettlement of residents in Musonoi who have been most adversely affected by blasting 
and dust from the KCC open cast mine; (ii) enabling access to existing roads that are used by 
MUMI villagers and (iii) provision of drinkable water to Musonoi and Luilu.  
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 Fifth, the fact that Glencore has permitted RAID, Fastenopfer and ‘Bread for All’ to 
visit its installations and sites in the DRC is an eloquent testimony that there is some dialogue 
with non-governmental organisations (NGOs). To this end, Peyer et al. (2014) have been able 
to engage in extensive discussions and interviews with MUMI and KCC management as well 
as the representatives of Glencore in Switzerland. However, it is important to note that 
Glencore has also been threatening and exerting pressure on these NGOs. Such threats of 
legal action are viewed by Peyer et al. (2014) as manoeuvres to deflect criticism which is 
inconsistent with constructive engagement of dialogue with NGOs. 
 In the third stand in the literature, Peyer et al. (2014) concluded from their research 
that in spite of efforts devoted by Glencore towards improving its CSR in the DRC, not much 
has changed on the ground in the country. The authors noted that the company’s human 
rights, social and environmental performance is lacking in the international standards the 
MNC supposedly subscribes to. Half-measures and non-transparent tactics are still being 
employed by Glencore. In summary, it is apparent from RAID, Fastenopfer and ‘Bread for 
All’ that the MNC has failed to make issues relating to the environment and human rights its 
top priority. It follows that CSR remains of marginal importance compared to Glencore’s 
continuing interest in minimising tax payments and maximising shareholder profits.  
  
4. Concluding Implications and Future Research Agenda  
 
This article has presented a case for transfer pricing as an argument for Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). The argument is that CSR and transfer pricing have been treated as 
separate by companies. But business ethics and CSR need rethinking in terms of tax because 
it is unethical and unjust for companies to “artificially” misprice their imports and exports 
between subsidiaries. The debate has built on the position that Multinational Companies 
should be more socially responsible when they are operating in countries where the legislation 
and laws in place are not effective in identifying and sanctioning transfer mispricing. While 
acknowledging that transfer pricing (TP) is a legal accounting practice, we have argued that in 
view of its poverty and underdevelopment externalities, the practice per se should be of a 
strong justification for CSR. This is because TP is also connected with schemes that deprive 
developing countries from capital essential for investments in health, education and 
development programmes. Intuitively, transfer mispricing practices are concealed by MNCs 
within the framework of TP which is considered as legal. Therefore since MNCs would not 
admit to engaging in transfer mispricing, CSR can also be considered as some form of social 
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justice. We have further argued that CSR by multinational corporations could incite domestic 
companies to comply more willingly with their tax obligations and/or engage in similar 
activities. Whereas, traditional advocates of CSR have employed concepts such as reputation, 
licence-to-operate, sustainability, moral obligation and innovation to make the case for CSR, 
the present inquiry has extended this rationale by arguing that TP and its externalities are 
genuine reasons for CSR. 
 The analytical argument has consisted of the following steps. We first described the 
connections between transfer mispricing, extreme poverty and CSR by: (i) discussing transfer 
mispricing as the dark side of TP, (ii) explaining the link between TP and poverty and (iii) 
presenting arguments for CSR as a compensation for transfer mispricing. Second, we 
consolidated our arguments with a case study of Glencore and the mining industry in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). To this end, we have built on an independent 
assessment of Glencore’s CSR by NGOs in the DRC to confirm three main theses 
surrounding our arguments. They are:  (i) the MNC’s top priority is minimising taxes paid to 
the DRC government and maximising profits transferred to subsidiaries in tax havens, (ii) the 
absence of a TP legislation that oversees mispricing by MNCs operating in the DRC and (iii) 
striking disparities between findings on the ground and Glencore’s efforts towards CSR which 
imply that the company still has much to invest in the DRC to compensate for lost income 
from transfer mispricing. 
CSR within the context of this study refers to a company’s initiative to examine and 
take responsibility for its impact on social and environmental wellbeing. The investigation 
which we have carried out clearly has implications for CSR debates and for company practice. 
While the study is grounded on the need to consider CSR simultaneously with tax, the 
separation between CSR and tax in many companies is deliberately done for political and 
strategic motives. On the one hand, tax issues and CSR are often held as distinct by 
companies in their existing practices and organizational arrangements. On the other hand, 
CSR plays the role of a substitute for paying tax because stopping tax avoidance would affect 
the economic bottom line of companies. 
Given the limited resources of tax administration in poor countries, especially in terms 
of respecting the arm’s length principle, it will require stronger international regulation to 
help curb transfer mispricing. For instances, a unitary taxation for international corporations 
and/or requiring MNCs to adopt the Fair Tax Mark Initiative. The Initiative is an accolade 
which companies achieve if they adopt nondiscriminatory and transparent tax practices. If it is 
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required, it would entail a major change of international law, and the creation of an 
international body to really assess how MNCs comply with the criteria.  
 As a caveat, transfer mispricing is a systemic problem and company’s voluntary CSR 
commitments are not meant to address it. The argument in the paper is not a suggestion that a 
different kind of CSR could deal with the difficulty of transfer mispricing. The debate is that 
when legislation and laws of countries in which MNCs operate are not effective at identifying 
and abolishing transfer mispricing, MNCs should be more socially responsible. This 
recommendation is essentially because by virtue of rationality, they are very likely to engage 
in transfer mispricing in order to evade taxes and protect their economic bottom lines. 
 Future research agenda can focus on assessing how the Fair Tax Mark Initiative has 
improved CSR on the one hand and decreased transfer mispricing on the other. Since, the 
barriers that have stopped CSR from moving to social justice have not been discussed in this 
study, future inquiries may improve the extant literature by providing answers to the 
following questions. How can companies be made to address ‘social justice’ as part of their 
CSR agendas? And what reforms are needed? It would also be worthwhile for future studies 
to consider the problem statement in the light of assessing if taxing profits is the appropriate 
avenue of taxation for natural-resource wealthy developing countries. In this light, the 
Norwegian style resource rent tax may be more adequate and could go far in making transfer 
pricing a less relevant topic. 
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